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Philosophy of values as the basis of the directions in the 
development of educational science in Poland (1918‒1939)
Filosofia dei valori come base delle direzioni di sviluppo 
nelle scienze dell’educazione in Polonia (1918-1939)
Pedagogy of culture in Poland has experienced a broad, diverse and multi-threaded kind of
development. A personal-creative role of values in the process of education lies at its core, while
the pluralism of its directions stems from the different philosophical bases (along with religions
affiliated with them) that became the constituents of its concepts. The article presents the clas-
sification of the selected directions in the development of educational science. It brings out both
their individuality and specificities. The core aim is to present the panorama of directions within
the ‘pedagogy of culture’ in Poland in 1918-1939 with their philosophical and educational
foundations, also characteristic of the rest of Central Europe at the time.
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La “pedagogia della cultura” in Polonia ha conosciuto uno sviluppo esteso, complesso
e multiforme. Al cuore di tale sviluppo si trova il ruolo creativo e personale dei valori
nel processo educativo, mentre il pluralismo delle direzioni intraprese si radica in di-
verse ispirazioni filosofiche (e religiose ad esse affiliate) che ne ispirano i concetti.
L’articolo presenta la classificazione di alcune direzioni di sviluppo delle scienze del-
l’educazione, sottolineandone le specificità e particolarità. L’obiettivo è presentare il
panorama di correnti nella “pedagogia della cultura” in Polonia nel periodo 1918-
1939 con attenzione ai fondamenti filosofici e pedagogici, comuni alla cultura del-
l’Europa Centrale nello stesso periodo.
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1. Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that the anti-naturalist turn in the humanities (also
known as the “new humanities”), which took place in the early 20th century
under the influence of German idealism, the Baden neo-Kantians (Windel-
band, Rickert) and the phenomenologists (Scheler, Niemeyer), contributed
to the development of educational science. The direction of development in
educational science was inspired by different concepts of the philosophy of
values and was described in Polish science as the “pedagogy of culture” or,
less often, the “pedagogy of spiritual life” (and I propose such a translation of
this Polish term in this paper). In German literature, it was referred to as gei-
steswissenschaftliche Pädagogik (Tröhler, 2003, pp. 759 778). The aforementioned
spirituality was based on an extended understanding of the Hegelian objective
Spirit as the subject and content of history (Hegel referred to Spirit as “all
morality, law, art, religion and philosophy that is a historical normative im-
plementation of general values in cultural assets” (Suchodolski, 1993, p. 548)).
Wilhelm Dilthey’s concept and notions of: spirit, values and the “understan-
ding” of mental and spiritual worlds (the understanding of people and senses),
which were contrasted with the positivist “explanation”, were direct and me-
thodologically the most inspiring ideas for the pedagogy of culture. Under-
standing the spiritual reality (along with its methodological scheme) became
the leading thesis of the new humanities and, at the same time, the pedagogy
of culture, offering a type of cognition that was oriented on values and cul-
tural assets.
This interpretation of the sources and development of the pedagogy of
culture [Germ. geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik] is based on actual phenomena,
yet it ignores the contribution of the philosophy of realism and theistic rea-
lism (Thomism and neo-Thomism) to the pedagogy of culture and, as such,
must be regarded as one-sided. The opposite direction of the development
of the pedagogy of culture rooted in theistic realism did not have such a
spectacular founding moment as the “anti-naturalistic turn” (due to its per-
manent distance to it), but it was continued immediately after St. Thomas’s
work. In the inter-war period, concepts of the pedagogy of culture focused
on values and cultural assets were significantly developed with the participa-
tion of theistic realism. As has been already mentioned, the development was
stopped by the ideological terror in Poland after World War II.
In addition to these tendencies in the Polish pedagogy of culture between
1918 and 1939, there was a humanistic and pedagogical thought that prefer-
red neither idealism nor theistic realism. It was Florian Znaniecki’s cultura-
lism and socialist concepts sympathetic to Marxism that set down its leftist
direction of development.
This situation, pluralistic as it was, gave rise to three directions of the de-
velopment of the pedagogy of culture in Poland between 1918 and 1939:
1) the secular and idealistic direction – referring to the philosophy of Ger-
man idealism, Hegel’s objective Spirit, the Baden neo-Kantians and the
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phenomenologists. In Poland, it was represented primarily by Bogdan
Nawroczyński and Sergiusz Hessen;
2) the Catholic and realistic direction – based on the philosophy of theistic
realism (Thomism and neo-Thomism), critical of the philosophy of Ger-
man idealism (particularly the Hegelian objective Spirit) and neo-Kan-
tianism; strongly striving to preserve Polish cultural and national identity.
In Poland, it was represented by Fr. Jan Ciemniewski, Fr. Zygmunt Bie-
lawski, Sr. Barbara Żulińska, C.R., Fr. Henryk Weryński, Lucjan Zarzecki
and Stefan Szuman;
3) the leftist and culturalistic direction – rooted in leftist Polish philosophy
and culture (Edward Abramowski, Stanisław Brzozowski) and Marxist
ideology, represented by Zygmunt Mysłakowski and Bogdan Suchodolski;
there was also Florian Znaniecki’s culturalism which was inspired by va-
rious philosophical and ideological sources.
As Catholicism was the dominant religion in Poland, the Catholic and
realistic direction left the greatest legacy in the form of a wide range of pe-
dagogical concepts. The openness of Poland also led to the development of
other directions as shown by the country’s pluralistic traditions.
2. Contexts of the philosophical and religious sources of the pedagogy
of culture 
The philosophy of values played a significant role in the interwar period. Wi-
thin theist realism and Catholic pedagogy, it was noticed that there was a
struggle between Christian and non-Christian world views. The philosophy
of life was considered the leading type of the philosophy of values. In the
non-Christian version, life was opposed to the spirit, with which Christian
realists disagreed, claiming that spiritual functions also belonged to life. The
representatives of the non-Christian version (F. Nietzsche, W. Dilthey, T. Les-
sing) included conscious, rational cognition and rational will in the scope of
the spirit; life was supposed to include the irrational sphere of the soul, i.e.
drives, feelings, emotional and intuitive cognition, and subconscious expe-
riences (Sawicki, 1936, pp. 8-19). The philosophy of life embedded in the
nineteenth-century German idealism, and Hegel’s philosophy in particular,
was to replace traditional religion (the concepts of objective Spirit and Idea
replaced the concept of God). The belief in culture – understood as values
(assets) developed throughout history – was to be opposed to “non-historical
religious metaphysics and, at the same time, discipline man and master his
individuality by pointing to objective developmental necessities” (Suchodol-
ski, 1947/1948, pp. 315-316). The new religion, the “religion of culture”, be-
came a demanding tool of the historical spirit. The Hegelian heritage affected
the further development of the pedagogy of culture which aimed – as Su-
chodolski writes – at enclosing man in the historical and social world, rejec-
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ting religion and superhistorical metaphysics in addition to subordinating
them to the interests of groups. In times of nascent Nazism, this idea directed
the pedagogy of culture towards the ideas of state and totalism. This was re-
flected primarily in the pedagogy of G. Gentili, P. Petersen and E. Krieck. In
Poland, it is believed that these people discredited the pedagogy of culture
(Ivi, p. 316), making it Nazi.
In response to these philosophical foundations of pedagogy, the realists
(neo-Thomists) pointed to other sources of the philosophy of values adopted
on Catholic grounds; they indicated their origins in Plato, Aristotle and scho-
lasticism. While the theory of values was not yet an independent and separate
theory, the concept of value was included in the concept of good in “peren-
nial philosophy”. A value was believed to be that which is honourable and
respectful because it is useful, pleasant and beautiful (Sawicki, 1936, p.18).
In opposition to the approach of the value theory and geisteswissenschaf-
tliche Pädagogik based on the German idealistic philosophy (including neo-
Kantianism), Franciszek Sawicki created its realistic and neo-Thomist variant.
It was outlined in his work entitled Filozofia życia [The Philosophy of Life]
(1936). He entered into a polemic with idealists, proposing a Catholic un-
derstanding of values and the philosophy of life. In this way, he questioned
the fact that the philosophy of values was first introduced by the Neo-Kan-
tian-Baden School and the phenomenologists (M. Scheler). By unveiling the
presence of values in Thomism, he confirmed the existence of Catholic sour-
ces of this variety of the philosophy of culture and pedagogy.
Sawicki adopted a negative approach to theories according to which va-
lues are deprived of objective meaning and made dependent on a human
being. Consequently, subjectivism and relativism become cognitive, moral
and aesthetic attitudes, and the world of values cannot become a higher order
for a human being (Sawicki, 1938). In this way, man is deprived of faith in
the world of divine ideas of truth, goodness and beauty. Here, Sawicki agreed
with Jaspers (1933, p.13) that man deprived of faith faces nothingness (Sa-
wicki, 1936, p. 32). When distinguishing two basic groups of values, sensual
and spiritual, Sawicki gave precedence to spiritual values – which is a constant
feature of this philosophy. According to him, the latter include logical, ae-
sthetic, moral and religious values, while the former include sensual pleasures,
useful (economic) values and vital values (health, physical strength). Values
are independent of man and he should recognise them. Spiritual values are
valid for all people at all times, regardless of class, nationality, and other dif-
ferences including, inter alia, truth, justice, faithfulness and honesty. They are
the reflection of the highest value which is God. They are manifested in na-
tural laws, and all norms and principles of the practice of life originate in
the sphere of the spirit (Sawicki, 1936, p. 34). Sawicki’s concept shows the
distance between the spirit of Catholic realism (Thomism) and the spirit of
the idealistic (Protestant) philosophy of values.
Sawicki notices that philosophers of values include thinkers who are close
to Christianity. He accepts the statements of  Windelbank, Rickert and Sche-
ler in which they acknowledge the existence in the world of “the eternal
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values of truth, goodness and beauty, similar to the Platonic world of divine
ideas” (Sawicki, 1936, p. 19), but he questions the antecedence of their views.
He claims that this thought refers to the philosophy of Saint Augustine, who
said that “all truth and all goodness is a reflection of the eternal truth and
absolute goodness which is God” [Ibidem, as quoted in Minrath (1927)]. He
adds that Thomas Aquinas also took account of the value of earthly cultural
assets, respecting the supremacy of supernatural assets.
3. The secular and idealistic direction
The pre-1939 chronological origin of the secular and idealistic thought
should be associated with the beginning of the Reformation, through Hegel’s
works, through the Baden neo-Kantianists. Bogdan Nawroczyński is the most
outstanding representative of the Polish pedagogy of culture originating in
the German idealistic philosophy.
The concept of Bogdan Nawroczyński (1882-1974). As an avowed repre-
sentative of the pedagogy of culture, Nawroczy ski stressed his intellectual
relations with the aforementioned group of German humanists. On the other
hand, he also had scholarly connections with the Lvov-Warsaw School. De-
claring his support for the slogans of the French Revolution, he also empha-
sised his attachment to his national culture and his own patriotism, stressed
the importance of the nation and Polish affairs, and even took up fight for
the country (Nawroczyński, 1932). His national and patriotic views clashed
with his secular sympathies and references to the French Revolution.
Nawroczyński’s pedagogy and philosophy of culture is particularly ex-
pressed in his research subject, which is spiritual life. Its internal dimension
could have inclined him to focus on the individual, but Nawroczyński con-
centrated on a group, humankind (Nawroczyński, 1947, p. 45)1. In his opi-
nion, in the development of culture people aspire to increasingly ambitious
goals and finally to absolute values. This is, he stated, the ultimate goal of
both the individual and humankind. He reached for absolute values which
humanise our species and expressed the hope that they would contribute to
the creation of the idea of humankind. For him, this idea replaces the Abso-
lute as something that is above everything; something that “has never been
and is not. However, it is also something … that should be” (Nawroczyński,
1947, p. 223). Is this humankind ideal? As Nawroczyński wrote, this ideal is
now possible in small groups of friends. Ultimately, in reference to Edward
Abramowski, he saw the future organisation of humankind in economic and
cultural communities (Ivi, p. 116).
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1 I include this work in the legacy of 1918–1939, because the author wrote it during the
German occupation (1939–1945).
In Nawroczyński’s concept, and therefore his pedagogy of culture, spiritual
life is associated with pursuing a goal; this long-term perspective builds up
tension  the more distant the target is, the more intense the tension becomes.
It occurs
between being (that which exists) and the world of values (that which
does not, but should exist). Being, however, is immune to the world
of values. It takes a lot of effort to adjust it to human purposes. This
is also hindered by the objectivisation of cultural assets. Decomposi-
tion of moral life is the most dangerous as it sooner or later leads to
the decomposition of the entire culture (Ivi, p. 115).
The rescue lies in man and the strength of his character. Weak people can-
not advance culture and fail to bear its message. Therefore, spiritual life – and
thus education – is not an idyll; it becomes a “fight” and sometimes a drama
(Jedynak, 2004, p. 115). Man should take this effort – with the help of edu-
cation – for “future humankind” and the wealth of their own spiritual life.
4. The Catholic and realistic direction
The Catholic and realistic direction is characterised by a different understan-
ding of values, spirit, and spirituality than the idealistic and Protestant ones.
Its conclusions on the grounds of the philosophy of culture, the philosophy
of religion, the sociology of culture and the sociology of religion are positive
towards religion. The Catholic and realistic direction states that the presence
of God does not close man to the reality of culture and to creativity within
this culture. The basic condition for the existence and meaning of the peda-
gogy of culture is preserved here: relations between culture and the perso-
nality structures of a pupil are subject to development as the mutual
interaction becomes deeper – and this fact is the main axis of educational
processes in any concept aspiring to the pedagogy of culture. This echoes the
realistic tradition originating in Aristotelean thought that is still valid today
(Tröhler, 2003).
It is worth pointing out which of the idealistic and Protestant assumptions
could not gain acceptance in the realist and Catholic thought. Selected an-
thropological assumptions are important for pedagogy. “In Protestantism (M.
Luther), it was assumed that human nature is completely marred by the ori-
ginal sin”’ (Jaroszyński, 2005, p. 139) and that man is unable to repair it. On
the other hand, God helps only those who he wants to help. Already this one
element shows how much Protestantism differs from the Catholic approach,
according to which human nature is good and only has a flaw (like “a crack
on the glass”). The grace of Providence strengthens human aspiration for
self-improvement, which encourages self-education. A pupil’s bad behaviour
is not corrected through “condemnation” (as in Victorian morality), but by
promoting good behaviour. Moreover, the Hegelian concept of objective
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Spirit cannot be accepted in the Thomist conceptions of the philosophers of
culture because:
[Hegel] incorporated the nature-culture opposition into his philoso-
phical system. Nature is shown as … something alien to Spirit. On
the other hand, Spirit contains culture (art, philosophy, religion) which
manifests the return of the Absolute to itself. Culture is not a com-
plement to nature, but its opposition, and can only function in the
domain of Spirit (Ivi, p. 139).
Meanwhile, in Thomistic philosophy and its continuations in personalism:
“Culture must be open to religion because human nature is oriented on
goals (the values of truth, goodness and beauty), which cannot be achieved
only thanks to nature … or thanks to culture alone” (Ivi, p. 139). Religion
makes the spiritual development of personality dependent on experiencing
and creating values and relationships to God more consistently than, for
example, art.
The concept of Jan Ciemniewski (1866-1947)2.  This author presented the
framework of his concept in his work entitled Nauka szkolna w zastosowaniu
do psychiki i kultury polskiej [School Education as Applied to the Polish Psyche
and Culture] (1919), which can be called his programme manifesto. He ad-
dressed it to the future creators of the Polish schooling system in November
1919 in connection with the regaining of independence by Poland. He clai-
med that in order to maintain Polish statehood – which would best be done
by the Polish home and school – it is necessary to bring up a free, indepen-
dent and energetic man and woman who, at the same time, thinks and feels
as a Pole. The school should arouse the self-preservation instinct and teach
living in freedom and self-direction under new political conditions. Ciem-
niewski based his programme manifesto on his outline of Polish culture.
He began its reconstruction from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
At that time, the Polish nation “based itself on the moral principle of huma-
nity and not only discovered it as something permanent and unremitting,
but even opposed this principle to the Christian-German Europe already in
the Middle Ages” (Ciemniewski, 1919, p. 13). The quality of Polish culture
made itself known on the battlefields of Varna, Vienna and Cecora. It is based
on the fact that:
Poland was a precursor of human rights and man’s self-governance.
By the fifteenth century, it introduced the principle of the people’s
self-government and implemented it at home in the sixteenth century.
The laws of Nihil novi and Neminem captivabimus place Poland ahead
17
2 I reconstruct this concept in more detail in [J. Kostkiewicz (2013). Kierunki I koncepcje pe-
dagogiki katolickiej w Polsce [Directions and concepts of Catholic pedagogy in Poland] 1918-
1939. Kraków: Impuls: pp. 207–234].
of other European countries. The king in Poland was only a guardian
of the law and nothing more, and the state was not the goal but the
means to realise the noble type of man, a free citizen of the country
and the world. Poland was the only state in central Europe that was
based on free and voluntary membership of citizens. Only Poland ex-
panded its territories through unions (Ciemniewski, 1919, p. 14) while
other countries did so through partitions.
In Polish culture, the tendency for the supremacy of moral power over
established law and the glorious absence of “the cult of law” guarded the
country against phenomena that affected the West (including religious per-
secution). Ciemniewski repeats Artur Górski’s words: “Poland killed the ghost
of statehood. It replaced the concept of the state with the notion of homeland
... it encompasses a religious approach to man’s attitude to the world; reli-
gious, that is, connected with the whole of being” (Górski, 1919, p. 13). Polish
culture of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was the leader among nations
fighting for freedom and human rights.
Moreover, Poland often defended Christian principles to the detriment
of its own interest. Western Europe was notorious for fanaticism, religious
intolerance (the Inquisition) and religious wars. Poland did not know these
phenomena and rather was characterised by religious tolerance. Ciemieniew-
ski recalls Brückner’s statement that, during the Thirty Years’ War, Poland was
the only country in Europe to have a different – “human and noble” – po-
sition. At the Council of Constance, held from 1414 to 1418 in the Bishopric
of Constance in present-day Germany, Poland was the first to speak out
against forced conversion; it preached respect for freedom in the sphere of
religious beliefs before any other nation did. Earlier than other nations, it de-
veloped political freedoms and civil liberties. Poland came up with the idea
that the world is trying to achieve today: the idea of the union of nations
based on the principles of freedom, equality and mutual aid, without exploi-
tation (Ciemniewski, 1917, pp. 10-11) – one example in the history of Poland
was the Polish-Lithuanian Union (initiated in 1385, strengthened in 1569,
and existing until 1795).
Against the background of these revived ideas, Ciemniewski strives to
raise the value of work in education, emphasising economic skills, manage-
ment and agriculture. He believes that education focused on aestheticism
and shallow literature pushes it down the wrong path – the loss of economic
skills limits the development of culture and undermines the basis of being
(Ibidem, pp. 25-30). He perceives aesthetic culture as a harmony of beauty
and form, linking its development with people’s emotions and creative ima-
gination.
Ciemniewski defines intellectual culture as the flourishing of the nation’s
creative abilities. He places knowledge and philosophy at the top and reliable
education at the base. According to him, a “moral sense”, which takes the
form of a sense of duty indicated by conscience and reason (Ciemniewski,
1919, p. 18, p. 31), is the most important factor in the ethical sphere. It is not
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beneficial when we let “foreign strangers infiltrate our land, and we force
our compatriots to emigrate overseas to find a shelter and bread  is it healthy
patriotism?” (Ivi, p. 31). Where is humanitarianism and equality before the
law?, he asks. School is a place where the social dimension of religion is ful-
filled and it is to be the foundation of education. Education without religion
becomes only a drill or training because education is primarily spiritualisa-
tion; the spiritual sphere should be able to rule our senses to make us live
beautifully and nobly and to serve God and our homeland. Educational in-
fluence consists of combining divine and human elements.
Ciemniewski writes that religiousness is a feeling of admiration, worship,
gratitude and adoration of God. This feeling precedes the knowledge of God.
In his view, modernism opens up a path for subjectivism, relativism and, ul-
timately, extreme individualism. This will lead to complete anarchy on matters
of faith.
Feeling is always subjective and individual views are sometimes mu-
tually exclusive, so objective cognition is impossible under such con-
ditions. Even internal experience will not help here because we do
not examine the subject anymore, but our personal, subjective im-
pressions that are different in every human being (Ivi, p. 68).
Like most pedagogues of culture, Ciemniewski is interested in character
training. In the moral sense, to have character means:
to bring a certain ethical order to one’s conduct, a certain harmony
and compliance with the law, and not to be guided by the changing
impressions of the moment in relations with people, but to follow the
voice of conscience and reason (Ibidem).
Therefore, character finds its meaning in social life. Ciemniewski agrees
with Lucjan Zarzecki’s approach (1924, p. 191) that character is a constant
and visible organisation of all forces given to man (characterised by a com-
prehensive ability to learn, the power of will and growing self-knowledge)
in order to actively participate, together with one’s nation, in the life of the
people, and to serve the nation and humankind. He refers to people with
character as the conscience of the nation (Ciemniewski, 1927, vol. 1, pp. 29-
31). In Ciemniewski’s concept the axis of education is the relationship bet-
ween personality structures and culture as well as the current needs of the
nation. 
5. Leftist culturalism
The leftist profile of educational concepts is also present in the history of
Polish pedagogical thought and is represented by Z. Mysłakowski and B. Su-
chodolski. Their concepts are the subject of many studies and interpretations
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of Znaniecki’s output from 1918 to 1939 can still be of interest today. Thus,
when adopting the perspective of the pedagogy of culture (i.e. the relation-
ship between personality structures and culture), we should answer the que-
stion of how the desired vision of a new civilisation can be achieved.
The concept of Florian Znaniecki (1882-1958). Znaniecki called his phi-
losophy of social sciences culturalism (a philosophy of cultural sciences). Its
meaning boils down to the thesis that the humanities and social sciences re-
quire a philosophical legitimacy. At this stage Znaniecki rejected naturalism
and idealism as views on the living foundations of reality, just as he also re-
jected epistemological fundamentalism and positivism. Znaniecki’s culturalism
combined four concepts: (i) the theory of “concrete reality” (the way in which
the subject of cultural sciences exists); (ii) the concept of the humanistic co-
efficient regarding the way in which this subject is examined (subjects of re-
search are “always someone’s, never anyone else’s”); (iii) the theory of action
being a culturalistic concept of subjectivity ‒ action is directed at values, it
reveals the subjective aspect of a concrete reality and allows recognising the
presence of consciousness in the empirical world; and (iv) the concept of the
sociology of knowledge regarded as a sub-discipline of sociology (but not a
meta-theoretical reflection on cognition), and the knowledge of groups crea-
ted by people. His project of the sociology of knowledge concerned the scien-
tific community (Kuszyk-Bytniewska, 2008, pp. 957-961). 
In his work entitled Ludzie teraźniejsi a cywilizacja przyszłości [Contempo-
rary People and the Future Civilisation] (1934), Znaniecki develops a concept
of a new civilisation which is regarded to be a humanistic utopia. Irena Woj-
nar points to its relationship with H. Bergson’s work L’évolution créatrice [Crea-
tive Evolution] (1907), which she includes – referring to V. Cappalletti – in
the trend of utopian tendencies that appeared in Europe in the 1930s. Mo-
reover, she emphasises that the “new future civilisation” is the educational
instantiation of an “open society” (Wojnar, 2001, pp. 34-47).3
What is this new civilisation supposed to be? Znaniecki answers that it
will be all-human and different from national civilisations. It will also be a
humanistic civilisation with a predominance of spiritual culture. Its other
features include social harmony (no conflicts) and liquidity, meaning a dy-
namic balance containing free creativity as a normal function of individuals
and groups. Moreover, it will be free from crises and created by new cultural
systems. Only a humanistic, harmonious and liquid civilisation combining
all these three features will be all-human (Znaniecki, 1974, p. 23).
Znaniecki also asks what is needed for the emergence of the new civili-
sation, the deepest essence of which is human creativity. In his view it can
be originated by the creative efforts of people still belonging to this existing
civilisation. However, it cannot be developed at its own pace and its forma-
20
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tion must be consistent with its future essence. The new civilisation requires
conscious development of cultural forces which are essential for its existence.
Therefore, there is an urgent need to form people who are to become the
people of the future (Ivi, pp. 96-98).
To create a new civilisation a new man is needed, and to create him the
present man must be known. In this creation, both present and future people
have their roles, and the circles of life (educational environments) are instruc-
ted who they should shape: Znaniecki asks neither parents nor educators
about it. Those who want the new civilisation know the answer – they will
say how they should act. The new civilisation cannot be created without the
support of science and the resulting practice.
Evolution management is to be based on the ideals of culture, humanistic
values and moral principles, and for this to happen they must be inscribed in
the ideal of education.
Thus, the vision of the new civilisation is the criterion for what makes
up the ideal of education. Znaniecki tries to indicate the means to build it.
He is creative, choosing values and developing a strategy. He acts like a pe-
dagogue of culture, the means of which are the following:
1. Personality. This is how he formulates the concept of a cultural persona-
lity:
The cultural personality of an ordinary man, who lives from the cradle
to the grave as a member of a cultural group and a participant in the
civilisation of society, which is subordinated to this civilisation, is ex-
tremely rich and complex, even at the level of folk civilisations. It [ci-
vilisation] consists of all the activities that this person performs and
all the data that they encounter in their lifetime, taking a significant
part in cultural systems (Ivi, p. 101).
Cultural systems are the food and the grounds for and the content of per-
sonality. This fact is the principal factor for understanding the educational
process as it happens in culture. However, science lacks a cultural personality
theory, so Znaniecki attempts to develop it through creative exploration of
psychology and the theory of culture. For this purpose, he looks for external
inspirations and refers to E. Spranger (Lebensformen, Halle (1927)), thus ente-
ring the main direction of development of cultural educational science in
Europe.
2. The teacher. According to Znaniecki, a pedagogue is not a guide to the
world of values:
It is not possible to entrust the education of a young generation only
to “pedagogues”, the well-mannered people, or leave their social or-
ganisation to “activists” ... even the wisest ones ... Only supernormal
perverts, who have the necessary initiative and creative vigour, can
prevail in joint action (Ivi, pp. 358–359).
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Further, he writes about the need to create a new type of normality –
creating himself, the new man should not start with himself but with this
new civilisation, on the development of which all his interests will focus.
3. Environment. In this concept, the social circle receives the right to exert
pressure that inhibits or inspires creativity to push the exuberant indivi-
duality in the most desirable direction and to make it a co-creator and
companion for others. Admittedly, Znaniecki adds elsewhere, every group
should be influenced by an individual, but again he precedes this state-
ment with the following: an individual must be influenced by a group
that expects specific creativity from them. He describes the properties of
social circles that should surround an individual in childhood and youth.
The most important issue is that the social and cultural functions of the
circles should undergo significant modifications (Ivi, pp. 365-367). For
example, the family circle, while maintaining the functions of a physical
care provider, should be only a circle of entertainment for an adolescent:
[This should be] socialising, rather than political or fighting entertain-
ment, without a fight for power and without discipline. This is the
only way to neutralise the cultural impact of the family [emphasised
by the author] … Let parents forget their full responsibility for the
future of their children and leave the matter of their upbringing to
other circles (Ivi, pp. 368-369).
4. Context. Znaniecki made a “suggestive attempt to categorise various types
of ‘contemporary people’ to show that they cannot be the creators of the
ideal new civilisation outlined” (Wojnar, 2001, p. 45). He attributed a spe-
cial role to the social personality, and not to the cognitive personality, and
dedicated his theory to it. The social personality will determine man’s
readiness for the new civilisation. To create his theory he also used the
“margins” of the old theory and its category of supernormality (and sub-
normality). He reached for the phenomenon of supernormality, for peo-
ple who deviate from the accepted norms, because the supernormal were
always the creators of new qualities who went beyond existing bounda-
ries. Now the supernormal “perverts” must gain their creative vigour and
independence without rebellion against the new order and without brea-
king the norms. Znaniecki did not say that he expected change from
them; they are to be pillars and the force that will sustain the new civili-
sation (Znaniecki, 1974, p. 346). According to him, the duration of its spi-
ritual system will depend on the cultural fertility of its people.
Znaniecki considered the matter of directing change to be a burning is-
sue. According to him, a group that realises that the next generations would
have to be able to consciously manage social evolution was the team from
the Teachers College at Columbia University: Dewey, Kilpatrick, Russell, Ba-
gley, Brunner, and others (Ivi, p. 5). Not touching upon the deeper aspects
of the proposed civilisation, he wrote, “we have to think about cultural ideals
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for the implementation of which we want to prepare the new generations”
(Ivi, pp. 5-6). Not only this but also the previous thoughts put an individual
in the background, making them subordinate. The comprehensive framework
of the concept shows that Znaniecki’s vision results from his belief in social
engineering, and its implementation is to be preceded by great educational
engineering. Znaniecki joined the humanists who wanted to form a new,
“better” world by “creating” a new man. He did not avoid utopia and he was
not the only one to deal with this subject (the phenomenon of utopias was
later debunked and criticised in George Orwell’s works).
Conclusion
The withdrawal from subjectivism in educational theory and practice is cha-
racteristic of the pedagogy of culture [Germ. geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik].
The goals of education and their sources are external to pupils and constitute
an objective reality they are meant to grow up in. This cultural “material”
does not necessarily have to reflect the individuality of the pupils, yet this
kind of pedagogy wants to leave them with the maximum amount of free-
dom (which individual concepts do not always respect) to allow the internal
development of their personalities and enable them to achieve autonomy.
Both freedom and coercion appear on the path of this development, and
both of these educational measures are considered to be necessary. Getting
to know culture and accepting its values (experiencing their related states),
including them in one’s own axionormative system (with the postulate of
autonomy), crowned with creativity in all areas of activity are the goals and
the most general essence of the pedagogy of culture. They are present in the
three directions discussed in this article. In these directions, however, the au-
tonomy of man is not absolute (complete) as man stands before God, or a
vision developed by the creators of a “better” world.
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